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Over the past two decades, much research effort has been invested in the study of 
radicalization and the extremist (fanatical) mindset. Stankov, Saucier and Knežević (2011) 
cite the following dictionary definition of mindset: “A fixed mental attitude or disposition that 
predetermines a person's responses to and interpretations of situations”. In our own work, it is 
defined as “a pattern of beliefs, feelings, thoughts, and motivations that tends to be mobilized 
                                                 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Lazar Stankov, Email: lazar.stankov@sydney.edu.au School of Psychology 
The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2008, Australia. 
Abstract 
This study explores the structure of Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) within a 
sample of participants living in areas with enhanced risk of intergroup conflict. 
We were also interested in comparing members of three different ethnic groups 
(Serbs, Albanians, and Bosniaks) on MEM measures. A short version of the MEM 
scale was created for future use. We found that the factorial structure of MEM was 
replicated in the sample composed of people from both sides of a conflict. Ethnic 
groups did not differ significantly on the Grudge component of MEM. Group 
differences were pronounced on the Pro-violence and Utopianism factors. 
Albanians scored higher than Bosniaks and Serbs on these two dimensions. 
However, significant differences were obtained on the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) 
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under facilitating conditions” (see Stankov, Saucier & Knežević, 2010a, p. 70). The label was 
inspired by President Obama’s foreign-policy speech in Cairo, in June 2009. He carefully 
avoided using the word “terrorism”, preferring “violent extremism”, thereby emphasizing 
both cognitive (“extremism”) and behavioral (“violent”) features of “terrorists”, rather than 
the effects (“terror”) of their activities. 
The study of Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) is psychological in nature, assuming 
that its sources are within the individual (Stankov et al., 2011). MEM is part of a broadly 
defined personality rather than being typical of a small group of clinical cases (Stankov et al., 
2010a). It can be measured by asking people to agree or disagree with statements that describe 
one's feelings towards other people, institutions and courses of action. Crucial, of course, is 
the choice of statements. They have been carefully selected to approximate those endorsed by 
people who have engaged in or supported violent activities (see Stankov et al., 2010a, b; 
Stankov, Knežević, Saucier, Radović, Milovanović, 2018). 
This paper extends our previous work by exploring MEM in three ethnic groups – 
Serbs, Albanians and Bosniaks - who have been engaged in what can arguably be classified as 
an “intractable conflict” (see Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, Zafran, 2012). These groups differ in 
terms of ethnicity, religious beliefs and social customs. By using samples from such groups, it 
may be possible to address questions about the nature of MEM and its potential for change. 
First, however, it is necessary to describe the constituent processes of MEM. 
 
Components of MEM and their Assessment 
 
The definition of MEM rests on a series of empirical studies that employed procedures of 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. The outcomes of these studies have been 
described elsewhere (see Saucier, Akers, Miller, Stankov, & Knežević, 2009; Saucier, 
Kenner, Iurino, Bou-Malham, Chen, Thalmayer, et al, 2015; Stankov et al., 2010a; Stankov, 
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emerged from these studies as the ingredients or components of MEM and label them 
Nastiness, Grudge, and Excuse. 
  
Nastiness: War and Pro-violence 
In Stankov et al. (2010a), Nastiness was captured by the factor “War: Justification of 
violent acts”, while in Stankov et al. (2010b; 2018) Nastiness was captured by the “Pro-
violence” factor. The “War” and “Pro-violence” factors identified in our studies are 
conceptually identical—i.e., they both indicate the acceptance, justification and even 
advocacy of violence in dealing with enemies. In the present study, we used only measures of 
Pro-violence (see Table 1). Our studies show that, compared to other components, most 
people do not agree with statements capturing Nastiness: the arithmetic means on a five-point 
Likert scale with 1 representing “strongly disagree” are slightly over 2 (“disagree”) (Stankov 
et al., 2010a; 2010b). 
 
Grudge: West and Vile World 
The Grudge factors identified in our studies to date differ in terms of specificity. In 
Stankov et al. (2010b) this factor was somewhat narrow and was labeled “West: Sins of the 
Western nations”. Two themes run through the items that define this factor. First, the West is 
seen as an aggressor that has committed violence against other countries, implying that 
revenge against the West is acceptable. Second, the West is seen as morally rotten, and the 
statements that fall into this category can be interpreted as attempts to demonize the enemy. 
Items used to measure the West factor in the present study are listed in Table 1.  
In Stankov et al. (2010a; 2018) the Grudge factor is labeled “Vile World”; it is not 
limited to the West and it reflects general dissatisfaction with the conditions in the world 
today (catastrophism being one of its defining features, e.g., that the world is heading for 
destruction and the human race is facing calamity). In Stankov et al. (2018), however, the 
vileness of the world is primarily related to aspects of human nature (competitiveness, 
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for items used to measure it). Again, a common feature of all three factors (West identified in 
Stankov et al., 2010b, and two forms of Vile World from Stankov et al., 2010a and Stankov et 
al., 2018) identified in our studies is a grudge that may motivate some people to take action. 
The more general Vile World factor can be seen as having a distal source whereas West is 
both more specific and closer to what people in a society may see as a threat to peace and 
stability   
 
Excuse: God, Divine Power and Utopianism. 
The Excuse factor also takes different forms in our studies, but they all enable people 
to justify in their own minds the nasty and violent things they tend to condone (Stankov et al., 
2010a; 2010b; 2018). The items classified under the rubric of Excuse bring into focus higher 
moral principles and therefore imply noble motivation behind such acts. In Stankov et al. 
(2010b), the excuse factor was labeled “God: In the name of God”. In Stankov et al. (2010a) 
the factor was labeled “Divine Power”. In Stankov et al. (2018) this factor was labeled 
“Utopianism”. Since we see Excuse not to be restricted to religiosity, Utopianism may 
accommodate radicalized groups with atheistic orientation. The three factors of Excuse (God, 
Divine Power and Utopianism) are conceptually different, more so than components of 
Nastiness and Grudge. Nevertheless, even though they invoke different sources of moral 
authority, such as God or some kind of Divine Power or Utopian ideals, the common thread 
running through all these sources is a justification or an excuse for being pro-violent and 
having a grudge (see Table 1 for items used to measure these constructs). 
 
Volatile Regions in the Balkans: Ethnic Albanian and Bosniak Minorities in Southern Serbia 
For historical reasons related to its geographic location on the pathway between Asia 
and Europe, quite a few regions in the Balkans are inhabited by several ethnic groups that 
may differ in terms of religion, language, customs and national identity. Every country in the 
Balkans contains ethnic minorities, some of which at any point in time may be more resentful 
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Following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Serbia experienced a violent 
conflict between the Serbs and Albanians in the province of Kosovo. That conflict ended 
following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military intervention in 1999. 
Kosovo proclaimed independence from Serbia in 2008. Currently, there are simmering 
tensions in two regions in Southern Serbia where Serbs and non-Serbs (i.e., Serbs, Albanians, 
and Bosniaks) live together.  Although within these particular areas non-Serbs are a majority, 
in the country itself Albanians and Bosniaks are a minority. Both areas are also economically 
impoverished in comparison to the Northern parts of the country. 
One region is known as PreševoValley. It is located on the Serbian border with 
Kosovo and the Republic of Northern Macedonia.2 The two main townships are Preševo (90% 
Albanians) and Bujanovac (55% Albanians). Albanians differ from Serbs both in terms of 
religion (Islam vs. Orthodox Christianity) and in terms of language and ethnic background 
(links to an ancient Illyrian tribe vs. Slavic). Over the past two decades, an Albanian political 
movement in Preševo Valley has been active in demanding unification with Kosovo. 
The other region, Sanjak (or Sandžak), is located in the South-Western part of Serbia, 
on the border with Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo.3 The majority of inhabitants (65%) 
identify themselves as Bosniaks, an ethnic label referring to Muslims of Slavic background. 
They speak a dialect of the standard, common language (formerly Serbo-Croatian) that is used 
as the main language of communication in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Montenegro. Two townships from that region were included in this study: Sjenica (72% 
Bosniaks) and Prijepolje (34% Bosniaks). The political situation in Sanjak differs from that in 




                                                 
2 Information about the geographic location of the area and an account  of some recent conflicts can be found 
online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preševo (accessed June 12, 2019) 
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The Present Study 
Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) measures have never been administered to 
participants from regions at enhanced risk of intergroup conflict. It is reasonable to assume 
that intergroup tensions can facilitate radicalization of a large proportion of the population 
which, in turn, can cause an escalation of violence both locally and outside the region. This is 
because conflict may lead to an increase in the components of Grudge that could motivate 
those high on Nastiness, under the guise of some kind of Excuse, to engage in violent 
activities. Questions can then be raised about the relative standing of one group against the 
other(s) on different components of MEM, and relevant policy decisions could be made.  
The existence of a conflict, however, points to a possible refinement in the assessment 
of MEM and its component of Grudge in particular. Conflict is usually between groups of 
people that are not only known to each other but are frequently also geographically/physically 
close. The source of a conflict is usually proximal – i.e., having to do with something specific 
to past or present interactions that have not been resolved in a satisfactory way. 
In order to focus the Grudge component on conflicting groups, we adapted items from 
the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) scale to fit the local requirements in terms of target groups. Bar-
Tal et al. (2012) define EOC as “…a relatively stable worldview that creates a conceptual 
framework, allowing human beings to organize and comprehend the prolonged context of the 
conflict in which they live…  …it serves as a prism through which society members process 
new information and judge particular situations that appear periodically...”(p. 42). EOC items 
used in the present study are displayed in Table 1. In the chosen EOC items, both members of 
one’s own and members of the opposing group are clearly identified by their names. Thus, a 
high score on these measures indicates that a person feels strongly that the actions of his/her 
group are “right” and those of the other group are wrong. Conceptually, EOC items can be 
interpreted as proximal assessments of Grudge that can be used in the presence of some, 
perhaps intractable, conflict. Over the past several years, the EOC was investigated in Serbia 
in relation to the ongoing conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians (see Međedović & 
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Međedovic and Petrović (2016) used EOC in an effort to develop a better 
understanding of the MEM in a sample of participants mainly from the Northern parts of 
Serbia, which are not involved in intergroup conflict. In their study, measures of 
conservatism, traditionalism and egalitarianism, together with the EOC scale (Bar-Tal et al., 
2012), were used to predict MEM. EOC proved to be the best predictor of Nastiness/Pro-
violence (r = .29, standardized β = .23) and an even better predictor of Grudge/Vile World (r 
= .40, standardized β = .35). This empirical evidence suggests that EOC may indeed be a 
proximal measure of Grudge. However, one should bear in mind that, although many aspects 
of EOC can be easily identified in the narratives of extremist groups, the concretization of the 
animosity towards the neighboring ethnic groups was not identified as the dominant feature of 
MEM. It can also be pointed out that MEM contains universal elements of a “… (meta)story 
of paradise, encounter with chaos, fall and redemption” (Peterson, 2018), reflective of 
personality characteristics of the individuals. EOC, on the other hand, emphasizes concrete 
ethnic animosities that are predominantly a result of historical and political contingencies and, 
as such, reflect broader malevolent political narratives. Hence, MEM and EOC may be 
considered two aspects of radicalization: the former representing general dispositions towards 
violent extremism that are akin to personality traits, while the latter reflects prejudiced 
attitudes towards the out-group that are related to the contingent situational/political 
influences.   
 
Aims of the Study 
We address three issues in this paper. First, are MEM statements measuring the 
intended constructs? In other words, is the factorial structure of MEM in the volatile Balkans 
region replicable and sufficiently close to the structure obtained in other parts of the world? 
Our expectation is that six factors – Nastiness/Pro-violence, Vile World, West, Divine Power, 
Utopianism and Ethos of Conflict (EOC) – will be confirmed. If fewer factors were to 
emerge, we expect that Vile World and West would coalesce into one factor (Grudge) and 
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would be supportive of the MEM model. New EOC items can either become part of the 
Grudge factor (our first hypothesis) or, perhaps, define a separate factor which, in turn, has 
noteworthy correlations with Grudge and Pro-violence (our alternative hypothesis). 
 Second, we compare Serbs, Albanians and Bosniaks on factor scores obtained from 
the structural analyses of MEM and EOC. We are interested in exploring if these three groups 
differ on the Nastiness, Grudge and Excuse factors. It is reasonable to expect that, in cases of 
conflict, both parties will be equally aroused and therefore there will be no differences 
between the groups on the MEM factors. However, as mentioned above, recent political 
conflicts have emerged between Serbs and Albanians. Therefore, if differences on the MEM 
scales were to eventuate, one would expect to find them in comparisons between Serbs and 
Albanians on one side, and Bosniaks on the other side. There has been no armed conflict 
between Bosniaks from Sanjak and either Serbs or Albanians in recent times and it can be 
assumed that Bosniaks will be located below these two groups on MEM factors.  
Our further hypothesis is that the standing on MEM and EOC factors critically 
depends on a theoretically relevant contextual variable, i.e., living in the region that has 
experienced recent armed conflict. Thus, we expect to find significant differences between 
people (i.e., Serbs) living in the area of recent armed conflict (Preševo valley) and their kin 
living in areas with a reduced level of conflict (Sanjak and Western Serbia). We also expect 
the highest MEM scores among Albanians (participating and living in the area of recent 
conflict but being a minority in Serbia), followed by Serbs (participating in the recent conflict, 
but at the same time being a majority nation and living both within and outside the area of 
conflict) and finally, Bosniaks (not participating in the recent conflict and not living in the 
area of conflict). 
Finally, if the factor structure is sufficiently similar to previous findings, it may be 
useful to construct a shorter version of the MEM scale. With the growing use of large-scale, 
longitudinal, multivariate, and multimethod studies, the need for psychometrically sound short 
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Participants and Procedure 
The study was based on convenience sample of 600 participants from the Southern 
regions of Serbia – Preševo Valley, Sanjak and Western Serbia. The total sample comprised 
100 Albanians, 200 Bosniaks, and 300 Serbs (100 comparing themselves to Albanians and 
200 to Bosniaks). The average age was 23.53 (SD = 4.58). There were 295 male participants 
and 305 females. The average number of years of formal education was 11.57 (SD = 2.60). 
The participants rated their economic position within the country of Serbia on a 10-point scale 
(1 = poor, 10 = rich) and the arithmetic mean was 5.39 (SD = 2.83).  
 A research publishing centre specializing in public surveys and employing trained 
survey specialists collected the data4. Paper-and-pencil versions of the questionnaires were 
employed for data collection during the month of March 2018. The study was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade, Serbia 
(Protocol #2018-006).  
 
Measures 
All 43 statements measuring Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM, 39 items) and Ethos 
of Conflict (EOC, 4 items) employed in this study are listed in Table 15. The statements are 
grouped into Pro-violence (10 items), Divine Power (7 items), Utopianism (8 items), West (8 
items), Vile World (6 items) and EOC (4 items). Each statement was accompanied by a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree). 
The EOC items were formulated to pit one’s own nationality against that of the group 
with which they are in conflict. For example, Albanians were given the statement “It is well 
                                                 
4DEMOSTAT – research publishing centre: www.demostat.rs 
5 We administered 8 items of the EOC – each EOC belief was operationalized by one item. Two items were 
removed because their presence led to poorer internal consistency of the total EOC score. Another two items did 
not mention the outside group explicitly and, on closer scrutiny, they were judged to have conceptual overlap 







Stankov, Knežević, Petrović, Međedović & Lazarević: Militant Extremist Mindset in Post-






known that Serbs cannot be trusted” while Serbian participants were given “It is well known 
that Albanians cannot be trusted”. The same procedure was followed with the Bosniak 
version. The Albanian version of the questionnaire was translated into the Albanian language. 
To sum up, minorities (Albanians and Bosniaks) always assessed Serbs, while Serbs assessed 
either Albanians or Bosniaks, depending on which of these two minorities are prevalent in a 
particular region. Thus, Serbs from Preševo and Bujanovac assessed Albanians, while Serbs 
from Sanjak and Western Serbia assessed Bosniaks.   
 
Statistical Analyses 
Initial analyses were performed on the total sample using the traditional Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA, i.e., maximum likelihood followed by PROMAX) in the SPSS 
package. This was followed by ESEM (exploratory structural equation modeling, Asparouhov 
& Muthen, 2009) available in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 1998 – 2010)6. For the purposes of 
our work here, ESEM can be described as a combination of EFA and confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). It is similar to CFA in that one can specify the loadings on the variables that 
define a particular construct such as Pro-violence, Divine Power, etc. It differs from CFA in 
that the other non-specified loadings are not fixed at zero and, while the program may try to 
get them close to zero, cross-loadings are allowed. In this paper, we also calculate factor 
scores and use them in comparisons between the ethnic groups. Finally, the Ant Colony 
Optimization algorithm emphasizing model fit (Marcoulides & Drezner, 2003) was employed 





                                                 
6 We did check measurement invariance between the three groups, but the fit was poor. This 
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The first column in Table 1 presents arithmetic means and standard deviations for 43 
statements based on a 5-point Likert scale for N = 600. The letter R following the statement 
indicates that the scoring was reversed in order to make it in agreement with the other 
statements measuring the same construct. The statement with the lowest arithmetic mean 
(1.82) is the first Pro-violence item in Table 1 (We should never use violence as a way to try 
to save the world) and the highest agreement (M = 4.12) is with EOC item 40 (The fact that 
Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians have always lived in these spaces implies that they have the rights 
on this territory).  
The items in Table 1 are grouped in terms of the constructs they are supposed to 
measure. In other words, the first 10 statements are expected to measure Pro-violence; the 
average score for these items is 2.30, similar to what we found in previous studies. The next 
group of seven statements is expected to measure the construct of Divine Power; their mean is 
2.99, which is close to the mean of 3.09 for the eight items measuring the conceptually related 
construct of Utopianism. The average of the eight statements measuring West is 3.40 and the 
average for the six Vile World statements is 3.65. Finally, the four EOC statements have a 
mean of 3.51. 
 
Replication of the MEM’s Factor Structure 
Following common practice, we ran both EFA and ESEM analyses of the 43 MEM 
items specifying a different number (i.e., 3 to 8) of factors. Based on previous work, the 
expectation was that a 6-factors solution would be replicated and it would be possible to 
interpret the factors as Pro-violence, Divine Power, Utopianism, West, Vile World and Ethos 
of Conflict (EOC) along the lines indicated in the introduction. However, a 5-factors solution 
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EFA and ESEM analyses gave similar results, and the 5-factor ESEM solution is 
presented in Table 1. Results of the ESEM analysis show that the Chi-Square Test of Model 
Fit was 1632.00 with df = 698. This fit index is typically seen as satisfactory if the ratio of 
Chi-square and the df is between 2 and 3. Another two commonly used indices, CFI (0.864) 
and TLI (0.825), are somewhat below their suggested criterion value of .90. However, both 
RMSEA (0.047) and SRMR (0.037) are lower than 0.08 and 0.05 and are therefore 
acceptable. Overall, the 5-factors solution presented in Table 1 has reasonably acceptable fit 
indices.  
The factor pattern matrix obtained from the exploratory structural equation modeling 
(ESEM) procedure is presented in Table 1. There are several aspects of this matrix that need 
to be noted. First, asterisks (*) indicate the cells that are expected to produce significant 
loadings for a given factor. Second, all loadings higher than .30 are presented in Table 1. For 
some cells, both asterisks and loadings are present, confirming the expectations. For other 
cells, only one of these two bits of information is present, indicating that the expected loading 
is not confirmed. The factors can be interpreted as follows.  
Factor 1: Pro-violence. The first factor has noteworthy loadings from nine out of ten 
statements that have been identified in our previous studies as measures of Pro-violence or a 
broader trait of Nastiness. The only statement that does not load on this factor is #2, which 
instead has a low (.32) loading on the last factor. There are two new loadings on this factor as 
well. Item #17 (Martyrdom is an act of a true believer in the cause, not an act of terrorism) 
and the low (.32) loading on item #25 (The unbreakable bond between the members of my 
group is sealed by the noble goals we are trying to achieve) do not modify its interpretation in 
a significant way. The Pro-violence factor that measures the acceptance, justification and even 
advocacy of violence in dealing with enemies is well replicated in the present study. 
Factor 2: Divine Power. Five of the seven items expected to load on this factor do so. 
Thus, the factor is reasonably well defined. This is a component of Excuse that appeals to 
higher moral principles and supernatural forces and therefore implies noble motivation behind 
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(items #12 and #17) have their loadings on the related Utopianism factor. Also, the nature of 
the Divine Power factor is not substantially changed by the additional loadings since three of 
these - items #18 (.53), #19 (.34) and #24 (.46) - were also expected to load on the related 
Utopianism factor. 
Factor 3: Utopianism. Four out of eight items that were expected to load on 
Utopianism define this factor. From that point of view, this is perhaps a somewhat poor 
replication of the previous findings. However, it should be noted that one of the missed items 
(#23) has low communality and therefore has little variance in common with the rest of the 
battery and the other item (#25) is similar in that it has low loadings on two other factors. 
Finally, item #18 loads on the conceptually related Divine Power factor. Notice also that three 
additional loadings on the Utopianism factor (items #12, #14 and #17) were all supposed to 
define the Divine Power factor. Overall, we can conclude that, even though the evidence for 
the presence of two Excuse factors is not as strong as it is for the existence of Pro-violence, 
the existence of the Divine Power and Utopianism factors in these data has not been seriously 
challenged. 
Factor 4: Grudge (West and Vile World). All eight items that were selected to 
measure Grudge against the West load on the fourth factor in Table 1. Also, all six items that 
were selected to measure Grudge defined as a perception of the world being threatening and 
unpleasant load on the fourth factor in Table 1. The Grudge factor is well defined by the items 
included in the present study. Additional loadings from some items – i.e., #16 (.34), #24 (.37) 
and #25 (.30) – are relatively small and do not change the interpretation substantially. 
It would be reasonable to expect that the three hypothesized Grudge constructs – Vile 
World, West and the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) – would behave in the same way as the Excuse 
factors and define three, perhaps somewhat modified, originally intended factors. Instead, the 
statements intended to measure Vile World and West factors load on a single factor while new 
Ethos of Conflict items define a separate factor. 
Factor 5: Ethos of Conflict (EOC). Four items were chosen to assess the feelings of 
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Grudge. Two possible outcomes were mentioned in the introduction – EOC items can turn out 
to be a part of the other constructs or they may define a separate factor. As can be seen in 
Table 1, all four items defined a separate EOC factor. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
findings of Međedovic and Petrović (2016), it can be seen at the bottom of Table 1 that the 
EOC factor correlates moderately with Pro-violence (r = .36) and West/Vile World (r = .34) 
factors. 
Correlations among the factors are also presented in Table 1. These correlations are 
relatively low and it is likely that a broad MEM factor will be weak. Therefore, MEM is best 
thought of as a set of symptoms, not as a trait like extraversion or neuroticism. 
Overall, the findings reviewed above can be interpreted as evidence of a reasonable 
replicability of the MEM’s factorial structure among the inhabitants of Southern Serbia. Three 
of the original MEM factors – Pro-violence, Divine Power and Utopianism - have replicated. 
Two factors – West and Vile World – have merged into one factor. This can be interpreted 
meaningfully as they are considered to be aspects of Grudge. Finally, a new putative measure 
of Grudge consisting of items that were based on the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) framework has 
been identified. These results indicate a satisfactory level of replicability (see Osborne, 
Costello, & Kellow, 2014).  
 
Differences between Ethnic groups on Measures of MEM  
In this section, we consider the arithmetic mean differences between the three ethnic 
groups on our measures of Militant Extremist Mindset. For that purpose, we employ factor 
scores based on the solution reported in Table 1. These factor scores are standardized for each 
factor – i.e., the total mean is equal to zero and the standard deviation is equal to one. The 
findings should be seen as preliminary - detailed examination of group differences on MEM 
and a host of other measures collected from the same sample is being conducted at the time of 
this writing and will be reported subsequently. 
Figure 1 presents arithmetic means for each ethnic group on all five factors. Negative 
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ANOVA F-tests for the differences between the three ethnic groups on each factor. Ethnic 
differences on Grudge (West/Vile World) are not statistically significant (F = 2.32). Thus, the 
overall level of endorsement of the Grudge statements is almost the same among Serbs, 
Albanians and Bosniaks. To put it the other way, all three ethnic groups blame the West and 
are dissatisfied with life in the world today to about the same degree. However, it is still 
conceivable that there may be differences on one of the components. For example, it would be 
reasonable to expect that Serbs may score higher on the West factor since they were the target 
of NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict. A combined West/Vile world factor score 
may hide this difference. This possibility will be examined in more detail in a subsequent 
publication. 
It is useful to compare ethnic differences on the West/Vile World factor with the 
differences on the EOC factor, which is supposed to capture a proximal aspect of Grudge. The 
F-test for the EOC is significant (F = 14.61*). As can be seen in Figure 1, the largest mean 
difference (.74) is between the mean for Bosniaks (-.30) and the mean for Albanians (.44). 
The mean for Serbs (.07) is in-between. This is interesting since both Bosniaks and Albanians 
compared themselves to the Serbs in this survey; it clearly indicates that Bosniaks view Serbs 
in a more positive light than do Albanians. These findings are difficult to explain either by 
religious or ethnic animosities (which should have pitted both Albanians and Bosniaks against 
Serbs and vice versa). Arguably, the fact that members of the local ethnic communities were 
involved in violent ethnic conflict explains these findings. Despite the fact that Bosniaks and 
Serbs experienced a terrible conflict in Bosnia in the1990s, this does not seem to have 
profoundly affected their local communities in the South of Serbia, but the conflict between 
local Albanian and Serb communities did. If we are right, the differences in EOC scores 
between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia itself (i.e., where their local communities were in 
armed conflict) should be much more pronounced than what we have found in this study. The 
question of why the EOC mean score of Albanians is still higher than the mean score of Serbs 
will be addressed below. It is worth noting that Bosniaks and Serbs are closer to each other 
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The most pronounced ethnic differences in Figure 1 are on measures of Nastiness 
(Pro-violence, F = 95.95**) and Excuse (Utopianism, F = 44.99**); in both cases, Albanians 
have the highest average scores. With respect to Pro-violence, Albanians (1.13) score more 
than 1.5 standard deviations higher than Bosniaks (-.41) and more than 1.23 standard 
deviation higher than Serbs (-.10). As shown above, most people in our study do not endorse 
Nastiness statements strongly, the average score being around 2.30 on the 5-point Likert scale 
(see also Stankov et al., 2010a, 2010b). The present sample of Albanian participants is 
endorsing violent means for conflict resolution more than any other ethnic group we have 
studied to date - their average Pro-violence score exceeds 3 on a 5-point Likert scale. We 
cannot ascertain from the information obtained in this survey whether the endorsement of 
violence has anything to do with the tradition of blood feuds that continue to afflict Kosovo 
and Albanian society in general to this day (Boyle, 2010; Grutzpalk, 2002). It can also be at 
least partially ascribed to the fact that Albanians in our sample represent an ethnic minority 
(like Bosniaks) in Serbia and also live in the regions where armed conflicts took place 
recently (unlike Bosniaks). It could be, thus, that being an ethnic minority and living in an 
area of recent conflict can substantially increase militant extremism. Finally, it might be that 
some unidentified factor has led to a biased selection of the Albanian minority sample, such 
that the majority of participants stand exceptionally high on the MEM factors. 
With respect to Utopianism, it can be seen in Figure 1 that Albanians (.73) are 1.09 
standard deviations above Serbs (-.36). Thus, Albanians believe significantly more than Serbs 
that their actions enable creating an ideal, paradise-like world in future. A replication of this 
result and further analyses will be needed to explain this difference. 
 
MEM among Serbs Living in and Outside Areas of Recent Conflict  
In this study, the only ethnic group whose members live both in the areas of recent 
armed conflict (Preševo and Bujanovac) and in the areas where no armed conflict has recently 
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factors extracted from MEM and EOC items in Figure 2. The differences between these 
groups are not significant on the Divine Power, Utopianism and West/Vile World factors. As 
predicted by our second hypothesis, the EOC factor differentiated highly (F = 125.11**) 
between Serbs living in areas of recent armed conflict (arithmetic mean = .85) and those 
living outside these areas (arithmetic mean = -.32). Hence, the EOC factor is more sensitive to 
the dominant political animosities that led to a serious armed conflict than the rest of the 
MEM factors. This interpretation is also consistent with the claim that EOC is less rooted in 
personality than are the other MEM factors.  
The comparison between Serbs and Albanians living in the area of recent conflict is 
also quite informative. As can be seen in Figure 2, the average EOC score for Serbs from the 
Preševo region (.85) is higher than the average score of Albanians (.44) from the same region 
that are presented in Figure 1. In this particular case, the ethnic group that is identified with 
the nation-state (Serbia) appears to be more self-righteous than the minority Albanians.  
The results presented in Figure 2 also show that the Pro-violence factor may be 
affected by endemic ethnic animosities. Although comparatively small (mean difference 
between Serbs living within [.07] and outside [-.27] Preševo region is a third of the standard 
deviation), the effect is statistically significant. This finding was somewhat unexpected since 
Pro-violence is known to be related to personality characteristics such as sadism and 
psychopathy (Međedović & Knežević, 2019). Therefore, the finding that the Pro-violence 
factor might be influenced by prolonged animosities between ethnic groups that result in 
armed conflict is important for understanding MEM. It is interesting that, although there is a 
sharp difference in EOC scores of Serbs living in the areas of conflict and those living 
outside, and there is also some difference in Pro-violence scores between these two groups, 
the mean Pro-violence score of Serbs living in the area of recent conflict (.07) is still 
substantially lower than the mean score of Albanians living in the same area (1.13 in Figure 
1). To gain further understanding of these findings, it would be important to have data on 
Albanians and Serbs from Kosovo itself because it is possible that scores on the Pro-violence 
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Short Measure of MEM 
One of the goals of this study was to construct a measure that can be used as a brief 
assessment of MEM. To this end, we utilized the Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) algorithm 
(Marcoulides & Drezner, 2003). The resulting short scale captures three MEM factors, each 
with four items: a)  Pro-violence (items  #5, #6, #7 and #10 in Table 1); b) Vile World (items 
#28, #36, #37 and #38 in Table 1); and c) Utopianism (items #12, #14, #22 and #25 in Table 
1).  Details about the procedures and statistics used in the application of the ACO can be 
obtained from the corresponding author. 
 
Discussion and Summary 
 
World regions experiencing ethnic friction and conflict may generate an increased 
radicalization of the population and result in outbursts of violence both locally and 
internationally. Measures for the assessment of militant extremist mindset (MEM) were 
developed in order to assess psychological dispositions towards militant extremism at a global 
level. This is the first study to collect MEM data from participants on both sides of an 
intergroup conflict. An additional set of items adopted from the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) 
scales (Bar-Tal et al., 2012) was included in order to assess participants' feelings towards the 
opposing side. 
The aim of this paper was to see if the main constructs of MEM can be identified in a 
sample composed of participants from Serbia, both majority Serbs and  members of the 
Albanian and Bosniak minorities. Overall, the replication turned out to be reasonably 
successful. A five-factor solution based on ESEM (Exploratory Structural Equation 
Modeling) analysis had marginally acceptable fit-indices. Three of these factors - Pro-
violence, Divine Power and Utopianism – were mostly replications of previous findings. Two 
measures of Grudge – West and Vile World – did not separate but defined a single factor. 
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Although there are differences in content between Utopianism and Divine Power, as 
well as between Vile World and West, these constructs are conceptually close enough to 
consider them as expressions of the same latent tendencies, i.e., Excuse and Grudge, 
respectively. That was also apparent in the analyses we carried out in the construction of a 
short version of the MEM scale. Thus, it was possible to construct convincing one-
dimensional models with the items capturing Pro-violence, Grudge (Vile World and West), as 
well as Excuse (Utopianism and Divine Power). The short MEM scale consists of 12 items, 
with four items per dimension.  
Finally, the EOC factor is a new finding reflecting the level of group radicalization. 
The items are formulated in a way that names the groups in conflict. Any future use of these 
items would have to specify the groups involved. However, there appear to be important 
differences between EOC and the other MEM factors. In particular, the EOC items are likely 
to be more sensitive than MEM items to the group processes leading to political 
radicalization. The extent to which both MEM and EOC are susceptible to the dominant 
political narrative is a matter for further research. 
 
Ethnic Differences in MEM 
In our interpretations of the ingredients of MEM, we have emphasized that all three – 
Nastiness, Grudge and Excuse - are necessary to understand the behavior of a radicalized 
individual and his/her potential for violent actions. It is assumed that nasty social attitudes 
exist in every society and there are pronounced individual differences in the level of 
Nastiness. Those high on Pro-violence/Nastiness are akin to some groups of convicts who 
tend to endorse similar views. If there is an increase in the level of Grudge, Nasty people will 
be more likely to become engaged than those low on this disposition. Excuse, either 
religiously slanted or utopian in the case of atheists, serves as a justification for violent acts 
and, like Nastiness, it is a social disposition/attitude present within individuals in every 
society. Our initial assumption was that there will be small differences between ethnic groups 
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Our findings indicate that ethnic group differences are not significant on the Grudge 
component of MEM – there is an essential agreement between Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians 
about the responsibility of the West and the vileness of the world we live in. To some extent, 
this is surprising since Albanians were helped by the West in a major way during the Kosovo 
conflict, but they still seem to feel the same as Serbs and Bosniaks about the West’s deeds 
overall. However, interesting differences exist on the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) factor: 
Bosniaks and Albanians differ in the way they view Serbs, with Bosniaks being significantly 
more positive towards the majority Serb population.  
The finding of a lack of ethnic differences on Grudge (i.e., West/Vile World) is 
perhaps not too surprising since it suggests that it is the social framework captured by the 
EOC that matters in conflict situations. By comparison, all three groups experience the 
perceived causes of suffering and pain measured by the components of Grudge in the same 
way. The important role of EOC is supported by comparing Serbs living in areas of recent 
conflict with their compatriots elsewhere. It is clear that the experience of a recent conflict 
leads to a significant increase in the level of EOC and, therefore, to the increase in the amount 
of blame directed towards the outgroup.   
Ethnic group differences are pronounced on the Pro-violence factor, with Albanians 
standing higher than both Serbs and Bosniaks. This may be interpreted to imply that more 
Albanians than Serbs will be prepared to join in the action should a flare-up happen again, at 
least in the regions of recent conflict in South Serbia. The reasons for such an outcome will 
need to be examined further. A recent book edited by Pratto et al (2017) provides a more 
detailed account of the cultural differences between the national groups in former Yugoslavia. 
There are also pronounced differences between Serbs and Albanians on the 
Utopianism factor. Our interpretation of this factor is similar to that of Divine Power – it is an 
Excuse for or justification of violence by invoking higher ideals. Notice, however, that a 
belief in an idealized world, which is emphasized by the Utopian statements, may also be 
interpreted as something worth striving for. Thus, it is possible that Albanians see these 
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Although the structure of the MEM has been replicated with the total sample of Serbs, 
Albanians and Bosniaks, an important issue related to the measurement of the Ethos of 
Conflict (EOC) needs to be highlighted, namely, that the target nationality differs for each 
ethnic group, with Serbs comparing themselves to Albanians and Bosniaks while the other 
two ethnic groups compared themselves to Serbs. Our approach in this paper is to interpret the 
appearance of a well-defined EOC factor as supportive of the claim that EOC statements 
represent comparisons of one's own ethnic group with the out-group, whatever this other 
group may be. An alternative interpretation may be that each nationality has distinct 
views/feelings/opinions about other nationalities – i.e., Serbs would endorse EOC statements 
differently depending on whether they are comparing themselves to Albanians or Bosniaks. 
Under this interpretation, the obtained stable EOC factor can be seen as a fortuitous outcome 





The evidence reported in this paper supports the view that the nature of the Militant Extremist 
Mindset (MEM), i.e., its construct validity, does not change significantly when the instrument 
is given to samples of people who are involved on both sides of an intergroup conflict. Ethnic 
differences on the Grudge (Vile World and West) component of MEM were not pronounced 
and it would be interesting to find out if this finding generalizes to other conflict situations 
(e.g., Palestinian/Israeli). We found pronounced differences on Pro-violence and Utopianism 
components of the MEM but this finding may be specific to the differences in social 
backgrounds of the ethnic groups in the Balkans. From the security point of view, proximal 
Grudge captured by the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) measures may prove to be particularly useful 
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ESEM Factor Pattern Matrix Based on 43 Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) Statements from Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians (N = 600) 
 












Nastiness/Pro-violence       
1. We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world. (R) 1.82 (1.15) .61*     
2. Those who claim to be against the use of any form of force are on their 
way to becoming slaves. 
3.02 (1.33) *    .32 
3. Armed struggle is the only way that youths can redeem themselves and 
their society. 
2.34 (1.33) .96*     
4. A good person has a duty to avoid killing any living human being. (R) 2.06 (1.27) .58*  -.35   












6. Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge. a 2.28 (1.36) .97*      
7. If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not enough 
of it. a 
2.35 (1.36) .97*      
8. The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives 
and make them suffer. 
2.66 (1.37) .73*     
9. Our enemy’s children are like scorpions; they need to be squashed 
before they grow up. 
2.26 (1.35) .83*     
10. War is the beginning of salvation. a 2.11 (1.26) .92*      
Excuse/Divine Power       
11. Only an idiot would go into a challenging situation expecting help 
from a divine power. (R) 
2.59 (1.29)  .60*    
12. Those who obey heaven will receive beautiful rewards. a 3.15 (1.34)  * .58    












14. All suffering in this life is small in comparison to the eternal pleasures 









15. If you believe you have received commands from God, you are 
certainly crazy. (R) 
3.16 (1.33)  .62*    
16. At a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people. 3.29 (1.28)  .62*  .34  
17. Martyrdom is an act of a true believer in the cause, not an act of 
terrorism. 
2.50 (1.31) .63 * .45   
Excuse/Utopianism       
18. Real life begins after one's life on Earth. 3.19 (1.36)  .53 *   
19. One day, a just world, free of exploitation and dictatorship, will be 
created. 
3.01 (1.25)  .34 .74*   
20. My group is destined to accomplish important things. 3.02 (1.11)   .37*   












22. I believe that a new type of human, free of greed and selfishness, will 
be created. a 
3.20 (1.27)   .58*   
23. There is a group of people whose uncompromised ideas and brave 
actions make my own life meaningful and worth living. 
2.97 (1.21)   *   
24. I am in awe of those who sacrifice their lives to the fight for truth and 
justices. 
3.21 (1.23)  .46 * .37  
25. The unbreakable bond between the members of my group is sealed by 
the noble goals we are trying to achieve. a 
3.04 (1.07) .32  *  .30  
Grudge/West       
26. Western countries came with their fleets and mad dogs and settled in 
other people’s homelands. 
3.38 (1.15)    .59*  
27. The West aggressively continues to keep our world under its control, 
so that it can suck its wealth and resources and keep it as a market for 













28. The West is degraded by its rotten morals, its lack of dignified values, 
its AIDS epidemic, and its alcohol and drug addiction. a 
3.42 (1.21)    .47*   
29. Terrorism in the form of unfair torture and execution without trial is 
carried out daily by many Western countries. 
3.44 (1.09)    .66*  
30. The West uses advanced science and technology not for the welfare of 
humanity but for developing weapons and the capability of destroying the 
earth ten times over. 
3.55 (1.09)    .73*  
31. The West’s salvation will only come with withdrawal from other 
people’s land and stop support for corrupt leaders. 
3.37 (1.12)    .57*  
32. Western leaders have forced their people to believe that we are the 
cancer of the world, thus we must be eliminated. 
3.20 (1.15)    .66*  












Grudge/Vile World       
34. Modern governments have overstepped moral bounds and no longer 
have a right to rule. 
3.42 (1.11)    .54*  
35. Today the human race is on the edge of an enormous calamity. 3.92 (0.99)    .59*  
36. Evil has been reincarnated in the cult of markets and the rule of 
multinational companies. a 
3.50 (1.07)    .57*  
37. The world is headed for destruction. a  3.89 (1.06)    .60*   
38.  Our people are in danger, everybody is trying to divide us and hurt 
us. a 
3.51 (1.21)    .63*   
39. The present-day world is vile and miserable. 3.66 (1.15)    .64*  
The Ethos of Conflict (EOC)       
40. The fact that Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians have always lived in these 
spaces implies that they have the rights on this territory.  













Note: SD = standard deviation. Asterisks indicate expected loadings. Only loadings above .30 are presented. (R) 
= reverse keyed item.  
a Items included in the short MEM scale.
41. It is well known that Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians cannot be trusted.  2.87 (1.44)     .96* 
42. If Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians are not united, there is a danger of them 
being destroyed.  
3.84 (1.18)     .62* 
43. Even though Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians strive for peace, 
Serbs/Bosniaks/Albanians continue to cause confrontations.  
3.20 (1.34)      .95* 
Factor Correlations: 1     
 
.07 1    
.25 .16 1   
.13 .29 .30 1  
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Figure 1. Arithmetic means for Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians based on standardized factor 
scores from the solution in Table 1. All F-tests have degrees of freedom df = 2,598 and * = 
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Figure 2. Arithmetic means for Serbs living in the areas of conflict and no-conflict based on 
standardized factor scores from the solution in Table 1. This is a breakdown of the total 
sample of Serbs presented in Figure 1. All F-tests have degrees of freedom df = 1,253 and * = 
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